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The job of legal scholars is to describe the structure and coherence of norms. Kelsen 
warned against reducing law to morality.1 Law is an autonomous system in which 
legal norms relate to each other, institutionalise their own change and organise their 
application.2 This system starts with pure thought and cannot be derived from 
biological facts. Kelsen’s ideas are still very much alive. According to the Dutch 
philosopher of law Kaptein, animals do not know such concepts as property rights, 
contracts and human rights.3 Biological predispositions do not engender rules. We 
need reason to make rules. Animals do not have reason. A biological theory can only 
explain some of our rules, but it cannot be normative. It cannot prescribe how people 
ought to behave, what they should do with those predispositions. 
 
Kelsen and Kaptein, like many philosophers of law, presume there is a gap between 
biology (or animals) and reason (which humans have and animals have not). 
Because of this gap, there is also an unbridgeable gap between facts and norms. 
Facts originate from biology, norms stem from reason. Jan Koster, philosopher of 
language, stated that the gap between ‘ought’ and ‘is’ makes it impossible to reduce 
ethics to biology.4 He called me naïve for appearing to do so. Maris concluded that all 
empiricists agree that norms cannot be derived from facts.5 Ross for example said: 
‘[T]o build a doctrine of morality upon a purely empirical foundation must be an 
illusion.’6 Even well-known moral biologists like Frans de Waal and Morris Hoffman 
that do not accept a gap between biology and reason do not dare deny the gap 
between facts and norms. ‘All that nature can offer is information, not prescription,’ 
De Waal writes.7 ‘The biggest philosophical barrier remains the naturalistic fallacy 
[…] we should always be aware of Hume’s command never to confuse the is with the 
ought,’ writes Hoffman in his paper on law and biology.8 Hauser, however, thinks the 
gap is not absolute. Nature may limit what is morally possible. ‘The only way to 
develop stable prescriptive principles, is to understand how they will break down in 
the face of biases that Mother Nature equipped us with’.9 If this is the case, 
empiricism is indeed impossible.10 Without bridging the gap between the ‘is’ and the 
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‘ought’ a true natural law theory is not feasible. Such a rigorous divide will cause 
jurisprudence to cut itself off from new discoveries in empiric sciences. I will therefore 
challenge once again the dogma that an ‘ought’ cannot be derived from an ‘is’. I will 
do this by responding to Pauline Westerman’s claim that a natural law theory based 
on biological predispositions is not possible.11 But first I will briefly describe what in 
my view is a viable biological theory of law.12 
 
II. A biological theory of law 
 
It is not the survival of organisms, but the survival of genes that dictates how 
organisms behave.13 It is important to stress this. Genes – in being molecules – do 
not have feelings. They have no goal. The essential properties of a gene are that it 
can be stable for a considerable time and replicate itself. It replicates itself because 
that is its molecular property. Genes that replicate better than other genes have a 
better chance of spreading.14 This process is purely a matter of chemistry and 
statistics. It is all about scientific facts. Genes have no direct control over our 
behaviour, but influence the evolvement of behaviour through priming chemical 
processes in our bodies.15 
 
Some genes cluster together, cooperate and produce a variety of proteins. 
Cooperation between genes is key. Although Richard Dawkins used the metaphor of 
a selfish gene, genes actually are very dependent on each other. A single gene will 
face many problems in trying to replicate and spread. It has to encounter the right 
molecules that are necessary for replication. The combination of a gene that 
generates a flagella and a gene that generates a device that can capture the right 
molecules helps both genes spread faster. Selection will therefore be to the benefit of 
the gene combination. But the capture-device gene has to share the captured 
molecules with the flagella gene. So only if they find twice as many molecules as the 
separate ancestors required will the combination be successful.16 Is the capture-
device gene altruistic because it shares its food with the flagella gene? Well, not 
exactly. Sharing is a necessity to find extra food. Without sharing, the flagellate gene 
could not replicate and the capture-device gene would soon be alone again. 
Probably, it would be ‘eaten’ by a stable gene combination in which the capture-
device gene does share. Is the not-sharing gene selfish? Well, no. It will not succeed 
and will be food for the cooperating gene combination. Genes are neither altruistic 
nor selfish; they are interdependent. Sometimes the cooperation of two genes is 
successful. In the same way, the cooperation of 1,000 genes can be successful. On 
the level of genes notions like egoism and altruism simply do not pertain. 
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Proteins influence their environment, sometimes in such a way that the environment 
enhances replication opportunities. These proteins can hold a cell together or even 
make cells cluster together. Frequently, these cells cooperate intensively and form an 
organism consisting of specialised cells that all have the same gene combination. 
When an organism reproduces itself, its genes spread over the population. With the 
right genes, the organism can build a shelter, thereby improving not only its own 
survival chances but also the replication possibilities of its genes.17 In the same way, 
it can be profitable to work together with other organisms. Other organisms can help 
fight enemies, can help find food, and can help defend its (and each other’s) 
offspring. Ideally, these other organisms all have the same genes, so that the death 
of one organism can improve the chances of the genes in its clones. In any case, if 
there were no gain at all for the cooperator, selection would surely act against it.18 
Thus, behaviour that is in the benefit of underlying genes will stay, behaviour that is 
not, will vanish because the underlying genes will disappear. 
 
On a population level, we can use group members to help provide food and to defend 
our neighbourhood against intruders. We are stronger with the help of our neighbours 
and when we cooperate we can become specialists. In this way, we can form a 
society that can defend itself even better and find more food, so that its members can 
improve on their reproductive success. Thus, moral guidelines have to be the result 
of adaptive cooperative behaviour.19 Moral behaviour too would vanish if it  did not in 
some way favour the genes that enable it. 
 
Everyone that cooperates benefits, so cooperation helps the spreading of our genes. 
Actually, genes programme us to cooperate; we feel we ought to cooperate. This is 
important. Biological mechanisms make us feel bad if we take action that is harmful 
to the group. Emotions are evolutionary mechanisms that help organisms survive 
without reason. We feel fear if someone threatens us, we feel guilt if we do not 
cooperate. These emotions serve no higher purpose; our goal is not to survive. 
Chemical processes, which cause emotions, do not have a goal. It is the other way 
round: these emotions exist because they cause underlying genes to spread. We feel 
we ought to live according to group moral and rules, because only humans that have 
such feelings can cooperate within successful groups. If we do not do what is good 
for our genes, these genes will not spread and they will vanish. The translation of this 
simple biological mechanism into the normative notion that we must do what is good 
for our genes, thus takes place by feelings that in their turn also are the result of 
biological processes. The norm that we have to do what is good for our genes, is not 
a must. If we do not, those genes will vanish and as a result normative thinking will 
disappear. If we act in the benefit of our genes, they will spread and we will 
experience this as good. Normative thinking is caused by biological mechanisms that 
make us think in favour of their spreading. It is not reason that dictates the body how 
to behave; it is the body that dictates reason how to think. Norms are a means by 
which our brain interprets facts so that we react to these facts in a way that benefits 
the spreading of the underlying genes most. 
 
We ought to cooperate because group members tell us so, for if we do not cooperate 
their lives will be in danger. In other words, we have an intrinsic and an extrinsic 
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reason to cooperate. However, both reasons are biological and factual: cooperation 
makes the spreading of genes of other group members on whom we depend – and 
thus the spreading of our own genes – successful. In addition, we will feel happy 
when we are being altruistic.20 We feel the approval of the group members on whom 
we depend. Again, this feeling is a result of chemical processes which causes 
neurological changes. These processes are triggered by genes because if we feel 
happy when acting to the benefit of our genes, those genes will spread faster than if 
there were no neurological feedback. 
 
Not only genes that make people tend to keep off intruders will spread. Genes of 
individuals that take advantage of other individuals within a society are even more 
successful. If we make our neighbours work for us, our genes will spread faster than 
theirs. So even when working together we need to outwit our fellow group members. 
We can cheat them, steal from them, murder them or even better: use them as 
slaves. People are equal, so they tell us, but charity begins at home. Genes that 
programme people to cheat will tend be very successful and spread fast within the 
population. Unless other people unmask the cheaters. In a stable society, cheaters – 
free riders – will be caught and punished. Their cheating will backfire on them; their 
reproductive chances will diminish and the genes of cooperative humans that only 
cheat in a limited and/or very smart way will spread within the population.21 
 
Thus it is vital to unmask cheaters. According to Dunbar the human brain is organ 
that is fit to localise people that want to take use of its body.22 At the same time, 
people have to keep cooperation up. The brain will use labels to identify group 
members and strategies. People that make use of my resources without giving me 
something in return the brain will categorise as ‘cheaters’. Intruders or group 
members that kill group members that cooperate with me are ‘murderers’. This 
behaviour is not conducive to spreading my genes, so I will label it as ‘bad’. By 
means of altruistic punishment, people punish cheaters, even when their direct 
benefit is low.23 The indirect benefit is that not everyone has to be strong and 
aggressive. Some can evolve other skills that are of the benefit not only to 
themselves, but also to the group members. In this way, the moral system combined 
with altruistic punishment can keep cheaters, thieves and murderers in check, so that 
the genes of the cooperators can spread. As Fehr and Gächter discovered, people 
tend to contribute half of their earnings to the benefit of the group, even though they 
would gain more if they kept it for themselves.24 They want to promote the welfare of 
the group,25 and they do this from feelings of debt and gratitude.26 
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Group members can help to find food, raise children and repel outsiders. Therefore, 
we will treat group members altruistically, as long as they contribute to the group 
according to group rules and group moral. We have strong inhibitions against killing 
members of our own community.27 We feel empathic concern towards them and this 
will help to stabilise the group.28 In a stable society, a system of control, honour, law, 
coercion and punishment has to keep people ‘civilised’. However, this system does 
not come from the outside; it grows within communities because the genes that 
benefit from a stable society – where free riders will face high costs – will cause it to 
evolve. When individual group members act as free riders, the other group members 
will experience this behaviour as unjust. They will take action to restore the 
balance.29 Just like chimpanzees do when food is taken away by some other ape. 
They will try to take it back, but if that is impossible, they will retaliate. They will take 
revenge, so that the other ape has no benefit of its action.30 Organisms that continue 
to steal will be punished repeatedly. This will inhibit its reproduction, in favour of the 
punishing group members. 
 
For out-group people the story is different. Out-group people can endanger the 
community. They can take food away, kill the children and use women to their own 
procreative ends. Non-group members do not contribute to group stability and 
therefore neither to the spreading of our genes. On the contrary, they are a threat to 
our genes because their genes will probably spread by diminishing our own.31 Thus 
murdering out-group people can be to the benefit of the spreading of genes of in-
group people. 
 
However, groups that cooperate can reach sophistication in making tools (and 
weapons). These groups will establish alliances and trade networks.32 Some strong 
groups succeed in subjecting other groups. These powerful groups will control the 
conquered groups by determining how members of other groups must behave. 
Members of the submitted groups will obey the new leaders because it is in their 
interest to do so. By obeying, they can survive and reproduce. Smart rulers will use 
group morals and group standards to make group members obey. As Richerson and 
Boyd state, ‘[t]he symbolic unity of the early state may often have been as much the 
unity of the elite as the unity of society as a whole.’33 The mightier groups will expand 
the morals of their group to the society they lead as a whole.34 It is bad to kill a group 
member, so it is bad to kill a member of society. It is bad to steal from your 
neighbour, so it is bad to steal from the king. It is good to help your brother, so it is 
good to help the government. Members of the dominant group initially parasitize on 
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the subordinated groups, but as the groups dissolve and eventually form a society, 
they profit from the new order. More specialisation is possible; the society will defend 
all members and can deliver all kinds of goods, luxury and health care. Members of a 
stable, organised and specialised society will be better off as attacks of smaller 
groups will have little or no effect on the survival and reproduction of most individuals. 
A society contains many smaller groups. Possibly, these groups were initially hostile 
towards each other, but later on they expanded their group moral and group rules, so 
that they could work together. The history of societies is from this point of view a 
continuing expansion of the group circle. The best way to fight war is to expand the 
in-group.35 African Americans are essentially Americans, not members of the black 
community; Dutch Muslims are essentially Dutch, not Turks or Arabs. Only if people 
feel other races are as much human as they themselves are will they desist from 
treating them as non-group members. 
 
III. Bridging the gap 
 
Still, it could be argued that a non-biological premise remains necessary: law ought to 
favour reproduction. But again, it is the other way round. Law exists because it 
favours reproduction. Without law there will be more violence and more free riders; 
there will be no room for a complex and specialised society. Law ought not to favour 
reproduction, it simply does. We feel we ought to live according to legal rules, 
because it is to our evolutionary advantage. This thought is in line with Hume’s 
observation 
 
‘that morality is not an object of reason. […] Take any action allow'd to be 
vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can 
find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever 
way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. 
There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as 
long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your 
reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which 
arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but t̀is the object of 
feeling, not of reason.’36 
 
For example, when someone takes food that belongs to you, the taking in itself is not 
bad. Nevertheless, you feel anger. That feeling itself is a fact. It is aroused by 
biological mechanisms. If we were to let others rob us of our food, we would die. So 
appropriating someone’s property is deemed wrong and is therefore forbidden. Apes 
and humans both feel angry when this unwritten rule is transgressed. Unlike apes, 
however, humans have developed the ability to put these morals in writing, in rules 
that can be used to classify single events as ‘ought’ or ‘ought not’. The underlying 
feeling is a biological translation of what will help spread our genes and what will not. 
 
Admittedly, this line of reasoning might be dismissed as merely offering an 
explanation for how rules have come about instead of a justification. Natural law 
should offer a set of reasons criticising and justifying actions or institutions. 
Evolutionary theory does not advance such reasons. Evolutionary theory might 
explain some of our basic institutions and values and does so by referring to possible 
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causes of our values and rules. It does not say anything about the normative merits 
of these rules. Yet, even if it is true that evolutionary theory has so far not advanced 
such reasons, the theory described above does. 
 
Jonathan Haidt shows how reason cannot be the basis of normative thinking.37 He 
does this through ‘moral dumbfounding’. Suppose an adult brother and sister have 
sexual intercourse because they feel this creates a strong bond. Most people will 
disapprove of this behaviour and may motivate their disapproval by stating that it is 
likely to produce abnormal offspring. This argument, however, is invalid because the 
siblings use contraceptives. So in what sense then is sex between siblings unnatural, 
and is this not also true of marriage? According to Haidt’s ‘social intuitionist model’, 
feelings of resentment are rarely supported by rational arguments. When the first 
reason is stripped, people search for another reason. And when all reasons misfire, 
they can only say: ‘Well, I don’t know, but still it is wrong’. According to Haidt, ‘reason 
is used to persuade someone to share our beliefs.’38 These beliefs are mostly 
unconscious and emotional. 
 
Let us look at this example a bit more. It is not to the benefit of underlying genes 
when siblings mate. Not only does this increase the chances of producing abnormal 
offspring, the handicapped offspring will also be a burden to the group. For the 
siblings ánd for the group it would be better if siblings did not mate. Evolution has 
solved this problem by the arousal of disgust when we think of mating with a brother 
or sister, or when we hear of a brother and sister mating. Statistically, incest will 
therefore be a fairly rare occurrence among humans. This evolution-driven feeling of 
disgust can be translated into a morally inspired prohibition: ‘If a man takes his sister 
[…] and they see one another naked, it is a scandalous disgrace. They shall be cut 
off in the presence of their people.’39 The biblical motivation for this rule is 
emotionally charged. Incest is forbidden because it is a disgrace. In some countries 
the rule remains in force to this day.40 In the Netherlands sibling mating is not 
forbidden, but marriage between siblings is.41 Ultimately, this norm derives from the 
fact that if siblings mate, this is neither to their evolutionary advantage, nor to the 
benefit of the group. 
 
Does this theory say anything about the normative appropriateness or quality of 
those feelings? Yes it does. Since the underlying, unconscious feeling of disgust is 
caused by evolutionary mechanisms, we can derive if sibling marriage ought to be 
forbidden in this day and age. The reasoning could start with the evolutionary 
disadvantages of sibling mating. Since contra conception takes care of this problem, 
this argument is obsolete. Another argument could be that such marriages are 
disgusting to group members. Sibling marriages could destabilise society and should 
therefore be forbidden. This is in fact how Devlin reasons, but he grounds his 
reasoning in the morality of society. He does not ask where this morality comes 
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from.42 The argument here is that this morality is determined by the evolutionary, 
biological mechanism of disgust. The question that should then be asked is whether 
a community can come to terms with this common disgust?’ The factual answer 
might well be ‘yes’. Many people feel an evolution-driven aversion to homosexuality, 
but in numerous countries, including the Netherlands and the United States, it has 
been shown that same-sex marriage need not destabilise society. 
 
Norms can therefore derived from biological facts norms as follows: 
 
1. Sibling mating produces abnormal offspring. 
2. Abnormal offspring is not to the advantage of underlying genes. 
3. Evolution causes people to feel resentment against sibling mating. 
4. People will feel sibling mating is wrong. 
5. Societies have to translate this feeling into legal rules prohibiting sibling mating and 
marriage, to keep stable. 
 
A judge will rule against sibling marriage on the basis of the law, just as she will do 
when imposing a fine. She does not realise that the law is a reflection of biological 
mechanisms. If she did, she could also point to the harmful effect of sibling marriage 
on feelings of moral propriety among citizens (including herself). However, as these 
feelings have been laid down as rules in the law and judges are appointed to 
administer the law, all that is required (and it is indeed required) is that they refer to 
the law (and to the law only) to support their decisions.. 
 
New circumstances can lead to new rules, for example: 
 
1. Contra conception will prevent the issue of defective offspring. 
2. Biologically, sibling marriage need no longer be deemed wrong. 
3. The ban on sibling marriage can be lifted. 
 
Norms derive from biological facts. We have mostly done this (and still mostly do) by 
translating our biologically determined feeling into written rules. Through these rules 
we can improve the communication of these feelings. This communication makes it 
possible to create larger societies, where because of, for instance, geographical 
distance and sheer population numbers feelings no longer can be felt. Even so, these 
rules are still based on emotional, moral feelings. Until quite recently, no ought could 
be derived from an is by reason, not until we learned that our feelings are caused by 
biological mechanisms, feelings and mechanisms that for a considerable time had 
been to the advantage of the spreading of underlying genes. 
 
The justification of the norm that siblings ought not to marry is an emotion. As Haidt 
concluded: ‘We just know.’ It is an emotion that has evolved over a long time. Rules 
merely help to communicate these feelings of right and wrong. Over the last few 
decades, we have learned that such norms in fact form an evolutionary mechanism 
to the advantage of group stability and therefore the survival of the underlying group 
gene pool. Norms are post hoc rationalisations of unconscious evolutionarily 
determined feelings, a feelings that reflect evolutionary, biological calculations. 
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The translation of feelings into specific norms explains why there are many 
differences between cultures. The more specialised a rule, the more it will vary. 
However, Paul H. Robinson and Robert Kurzban show that people broadly ‘share 
intuitions that serious wrongdoing should be punished.’43 The process of distributing 
punishment requires an ordinal ranking. Every society determines the most severe 
punishment (e.g., the death penalty or lifelong imprisonment)  for the gravest offence 
and from this reference point works through a list of offences. The punishment will be 
distributed differently.44 The ordinal ranking generally is consistent across different 
cultural groups.45 The variability in judgements is systematic and there is much 
consensus about the ranking of crimes.46 Mikhail found that the prohibition of 
homicide is universal and highly invariant.47 All the jurisdictions investigated included 
a mental state element. Justifications and excuses are remarkably similar and consist 
of a short list, including self-defence, necessity, insanity or mental illness, duress or 
compulsion, provocation, intoxication, mistake of fact and mistake of law. Mikhail 
shows that ‘human beings are “intuitive lawyers” who possess tacit or implicit moral 
and legal knowledge and a natural ability to compute structurally complex 
unconscious presentations of human acts and their components’.48 He concludes 
that future research in moral psychology should build on this naturalistic foundation.49 
Robinson, Kurzban and Jones search for an explanation of this intuition of justice in 
natural selection as the ‘origin of all complex, functional human traits’.50 Challenges 
of group living like aggression, competition, cooperation and moral sentiments enable 
the evaluation of behaviour.51 These emotions and preferences led to proto-moral 
and proto-legal systems.52 Evolution has in particular contributed to intuitions that 
condemn physical harm, sexual harassment, the taking of property and cheating in 
exchanges.53 Because the most successful strategy is to cooperate selectively with 
other cooperators, the ability to discern unfairness is crucial. Individuals that cheat, 
injure group members or take a free ride must be punished. A psychological system 
that can compute when someone is a free rider will therefore improve fitness. Shared 
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intuitions of justice contribute to this ability, will tune sanctions within the group and 
will thus reduce the number of transgressions.54 
 
IV. Is this biological theory of law a natural law theory? 
 
Natural law theories are sometimes vested in God (Aquinas),55 sometimes in human 
nature (Grotius)56 or in ‘self-evident’ basic goods (Finnis).57 Westerman relates a sad 
tale of decline with philosophers desperately trying to renovate the bulwark that is 
called ‘natural law’.58 The very title of her dissertation – The Disintegration of Natural 
Law Theory – makes any attempt to develop a new natural law theory suspicious 
from the very outset. In fact, Westerman concludes there are several reasons ‘not to 
try to develop a new variety of natural law doctrine’.59 If it makes no sense to develop 
a natural law theory, any theory that goes by that name is doomed to be invalid. 
However, before jumping to this conclusion, we must first determine if my theory of 
law meets Westerman’s criteria of a natural law theory. 
 
Westerman’s working definition of a natural law theory is based on four assumptions: 
 
1 There are universal and eternally valid criteria and principles on the basis of 
which positive law can be justified and/or criticised. 
2 These criteria and principles are grounded in nature. 
3 Human beings can discover those principles by the use of reason. 
4 For positive law to be morally obligatory, it should be justified in terms of these 
principles and criteria.60 
 
The biological theory of law I described above holds that there are universal criteria 
that are deducted from the characteristics of genes. Genes will spread if the 
phenotypes they bring about are sufficient to help their replication. This principle is 
universal to all living creatures but not eternal in the sense that these principles exist 
outside genes. Some genes predispose humans to intensive cooperation. This 
cooperation is intensified by the urge to punish free riders, who take advantage of 
group benefits but do not act according to group rules. Murder, theft, abuse, rape, 
damaging property of others and breaking promises are prohibited by positive law 
because they meet the principle of punishment of free riders. If free riders were not 
punished, the group would lose its stability and could no longer protect its members. 
This would be to the disadvantage of the spreading of the genes of the members that 
cooperate. If positive law approved theft, this would be against the biological 
mechanism of punishment of free riders. Positive law of this kind could be criticised 
from a genetic point of view. The biological theory of law therefore meets 
Westerman’s first criterion. 
 
But do we need this justification in biological mechanisms? Kelsen cautioned against 
the ‘Charybdis’ of reducing law to morality.61 Legal science has to stand as an 
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autonomous discipline. The job of legal scholars is to describe the structure and the 
congruity of norms. Law is an autonomous system in which legal norms relate to 
each other, institutionalise their own change and organise their application.62 This 
system starts with an authority that is competent to formulate law. From this 
Grundnorm all other norms can be derived by blosse Gedankenoperation (pure 
thought).63 Kelsen condems natural law theory mainly because ‘aus dem Sein kein 
Sollen, aus Tatsachen keine Normen gefolgert werden können.’64 Kelsen solves this 
problem by simply cutting off norms from empirical causes. It is the will – thought 
itself – that makes law. 
 
A dualistic thinker would probably take this statement for granted, but a monistic 
thinker certainly would not. It looks as if norms and law still come from an undefined 
entity, and in this respect this kind of dualism does not differ much from metaphysical 
theories. Divine will is substituted by human will, but the question remains: what is 
this will, where does it come from and why does it want what it wants? What is 
thought? Does our thought really works as systematically as Kelsen supposed? Can 
thought really operate as autonomously as Kelsen wished? Evolutionary biologists do 
not think so. Arthur Dyevre remarks that Kelsen wants to focus on legal norms 
themselves, ‘although legal norms are there to regulate human behaviour’.65 
Studying law as an autonomous system is trying to study an inherently human 
phenomenon while ignoring human behaviour itself. As a sect eventually loses touch 
with society, so will autonomously studied law drift away from other sciences. In the 
end it will become obsolete. 
 
Apart from this, Kelsen’s positivistic view amounts to pulling oneself out of the swamp 
by one’s own hair. ‘I have to behave in this way, because I say so.’ From a scientific 
point of view, this is unsatisfactory. When you understand the effect of gravity on 
gymnastics, you can use that knowledge to improve your skills. It will certainly work 
better than thinking that if your faith is strong, spirits can lift you into the air. Likewise, 
most books about law ignore the role of genes, but that does not mean knowledge of 
genes cannot or will not improve law. 
 
The second criterion is easier to acknowledge. The mechanism of replication of 
genes is a chemical process. Genes generate various phenotypes by chemical and 
biological mechanisms. The principle of punishment of free riders is therefore 
grounded in nature. 
 
The next question is if these principles can be discovered through reason. This is a 
tough question because ‘reason’ is a philosophical notion, often used as a means of 
pulling oneself out of the swamp. I would like to discuss this problem by responding 
to some ideas of the Belgian philosopher Verplaetse. According to Verplaetse, it is 
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forbidden to underpin a normative statement with factual findings.66 Moral is 
something we have in common with some animals, but norms are unique to humans. 
At the foundation of norms lies rational argumentation, not emotion or intuition. Ethics 
is about these norms. It does not ask why people think in an ethical way, but it 
considers the justification of our acts. However, what are the foundations of this 
justification? Verplaetse states that such a meta-ethical question is not useful. He 
quotes Peter Singer by stating that reason is just like an elevator, ‘once we step on it, 
we cannot get off until we have gone where it takes us’.67 There is no upper floor in 
reason. According to Verplaetse, we need reason to constrain immoral 
consequences of moral that is based on emotions. We also need reason to constrain 
the influence of irrational, mystical and supernatural ideas of religion. Reasonable 
ethics can be a guide in multicultural societies. Just like many other philosophers and 
in line with Kant,68 Verplaetse founds ethics and law on reason. However, what is 
reason? Where does it come from? In biology and psychology, this notion does not 
even exist. In these disciplines we talk of consciousness, intelligence, cognitive skills 
or neocortex activity. A dualistic philosopher might say that the neocortex could be 
the seat of reason, but that does not say anything about reason itself. No research on 
those billions of nerve cells can ever tell us what thoughts people can have, it cannot 
tell us what our mind (reason?) qualifies as ‘good’ or as ‘bad’. In this perspective, 
Westerman is right when she states that a modern biological theory of law ‘needs to 
argue that it is reasonable to act according to nature’. This is not possible if it is not 
clear what ‘reason’ is. The notion ‘reasonable’ even suggests there can be no 
fairness and justice without reason. This vocabulary makes leaving the trenches of 
dualistic thinking all the harder. Still, that is exactly what is necessary to identify a 
biological foundation of law. Reason is not divine in origin, nor is it a phenomenon 
that can exist outside the human body. Genes are a conditio sine qua non for reason. 
In fact, genes are the generators for the many steps between genetic replication and 
group rules.69 From a biological perspective, some parts of our brain make it possible 
to be conscious of our actions, to communicate what we want and what we dislike, to 
think over our deeds. This thinking we could call ‘reason’. Let us therefore define 
reason as conscious thinking that is caused by billions of nerve cells in our brain. 
Again, thinking is caused by biological mechanisms that make us think in favour of 
their spreading. It is not reason that dictates the body how to behave; it is the body 
that dictates reason how to think. Norms are a means by which our brain interprets 
facts so that we react to these fact in a way that benefits the spreading of the 
underlying genes most. This ‘thinking’ does not restrain our deeper ‘immoral’ 
biological urges. It helps us to survive. We use reason to persuade others to do what 
we feel they ought to do. Where then does this idea come from that we need 
normative thinking to restrain ‘immoral urges’? 
 
In a recent lecture, Verplaetse used an interesting example of this ‘immoral behaviour 
that needs to be constrained’.70 James Allen collected more than eighty photographs 
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of lynching parties in the United States.71 Most victims were African-American men. 
Most of them had been hanged, some had been burned to death. The killers seemed 
proud of their actions. They posed next to their victims for photographs and 
sometimes had postcards made of these. Some families cherished these 
photographs as keepsakes. According to Verplaetse, the photographs clearly show 
that humans need to be restrained by reason. Otherwise, they will kill each other and 
be proud if to boot. 
 
  28 September 1919, lynching of 
William Brown in Douglas County, Nebraska 
 
I think Verplaetse overlooks an important aspect. Most victims were black and could 
therefore be easily told apart from white Americans. They look as if they belong to 
another group and moral has likely evolved as an in-group phenomenon.72 Outsiders 
are treated far worse than group members. The lynching of African Americans is a 
demonstration of fear of out-group people and as such it is a biological phenomenon. 
Throughout history humans have been the main threat to other humans . Fear of 
strangers is therefore a deep-seated emotion.73 The white Americans in the 
photograph were proud of their lynching. Their conscious thinking approved their 
action. To them, it was ‘reasonable’ to kill out-group people that destabilised their 
society. The lynching of African Americans can thus be seen as an attack on non-
group members. The African American victims were perceived as a threat. The 
punishment did not fit to the crime, but was that severe simply because they were not 
considered group members.  
 
Do people need reason to know that African Americans are fellow Americans? Yes, 
they can deduce that African Americans are part of the group. However, the white 
Americans in the photograph considered themselves reasonable people. They simply 
reasoned otherwise. They justified their actions by stating that blacks were no good 
and posed a threat to a stable society. Moreover, the killing of outsiders enhanced in-
group solidarity.74 By contrast, why does ‘reason’ today tell us we should not lynch 
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people with different racial characteristics? Because they have become in-group; 
they hold important positions in our society. We not only reason they belong to the 
same group, it also feels that way when we see people of other races act (and 
speak?) like us. 
 
So, yes, nowadays human beings can discover biological, chemical, genetical 
principles underlying positive law through conscious thought. The third criterion is 
met. 
 
According to Westerman’s fourth and final criterion, biological mechanisms have to 
justify positive law for it to be morally obligatory. I have argued that there is no 
contradiction between biological founded morals and ‘reason’. Moreover, our 
conscious thinking is an extension to our unconscious emotions and feelings. As De 
Waal stated: ‘If human morality could truly be reduced to calculation and reasoning, 
we would come close to being psychopaths.’75 Without emotional attachment we will 
never reach a decision, let alone a moral decision.76 We think we ‘ought’ to behave in 
a certain way because our feelings tell us so, feelings that just like emotions are 
programmed to act in the interest of spreading of the underlying genes. Reasoning 
cannot deviate from that, because the very act of thinking is only possible because of 
a constant exchange of information between different parts in our brains. If one’s 
existence is involved, ‘facts’ will be interpreted in terms of norms. If one is not 
involved, ‘facts’ can be interpreted as ‘mere’ facts. A bystander can observe 
someone taking a twenty-dollar note from the table, whereas you can observe theft, 
which is ‘bad’, because that note was yours. When you let people take your money, 
you soon will have nothing left and come to sticky end, without offspring. You cannot 
let someone escape who acts contrary to the spreading of your genes. Well, you can, 
of course, but you will feel a strong urge to act against such an attitude of 
resignation. Letting things be can make you feel unhappy, which is a typical response 
to situations that are not in the benefit of the spreading of your genes. 
 
However, it could be argued that these biological mechanisms do not justify positive 
law in such a way that it will be morally obligatory. They explain the rationale behind 
racial laws; these laws were dictated by the fear of out-group people. But were they 
just? They were to the Americans that saw African Americans as a threat. From a 
biological point of view, there is no objective kind of justice, no summum bonum. The 
need for group stability will prompt individuals to sacrifice some of their benefits. Law 
can help to keep a balance between the individual’s interests and the group’s 
interests. It is this balance that is experienced as justice. Racial law favoured the 
Americans who made it and codified their fear of black Americans. A large society is 
too big to be stabilised by morals only, so what is needed is a systematised and 
enforceable code of conduct. This system can regulate the actions of the members of 
society. If people behave in accordance with these rules, they will live and prosper. 
When people comply with the legal system, society will become more stable and its 
members will feel there is ‘justice’. Legal rules within society develop because bigger 
groups cannot be stable without these rules. People form rules to stabilise society, 
because a stable society will improve their chances of survival and reproduction. 
Rules minimise tensions between group members. The rules are more or less formed 
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unconsciously in a historical process and periodically rationalised and written down. 
A predisposition to group morals and group rules may imply a predisposition to a 
legal system. With systems of law, we can build societies that are much bigger and 
complex. 
 
Why then do we nowadays consider racial law to be unjust? Why did Americans 
abandon racial law and reform positive law? From a biological point of view, black 
Americans became more influential. Racial law threatened the stability of society, 
instead of securing it. Positive law had to change because black Americans became 
to be considered fellow citizens, in-group people. We feel it is just to treat fellow 
citizens alike, because if we do not act violence within society will increase and this is 
not in the interest of our genes. In our society, it is therefore obligatory to behave 
according to positive law that treats blacks and whites alike. Positive law is not rigid; 
it is formed by biological mechanisms that engender different behaviour in a different 
environment. Nevertheless, it is biological mechanisms that set the norms of positive 
law. These laws do not come from some undefined reality, but are a way in which 
genes – through our brain – regulate our behaviour  to the benefit of their spreading.  
 
In this way, the biological theory of law also meets Westerman’s fourth criterion. So 
here we have a natural law theory and the conclusion should then be that this theory 
cannot hold, because Westerman claims that it makes no sense to develop a new 
theory of natural law. Is Kaptein right and must a modern biological theory of law be 
deemed a fable? In order to answer this question, I will analyse Westerman’s 
conclusions.77 
 
V. A modern natural law theory 
 
The biological theory of law cannot be dismissed for the same reason that Aquinas’ 
natural law theory was dismissed.78 Biological theory needs no god, nor his 
judgement or will. Biological theory cannot rule out there is a god. It is thinkable there 
is a god that created our world, a god whose power is embedded in the powers and 
mechanisms of nature, a god that escapes our empirical observation. However, such 
a god is unknowable, and it therefore makes no sense to include a deity in our 
theories. Grotius thinks along these lines. Natural law is proximately grounded in 
human nature, so human nature can serve as the basis of natural law. Criteria for 
right and wrong cannot be found outside human nature.79 According to Westerman, 
this concept does not help natural law. ‘The traditional dilemmas concerning God’s 
relation to natural law recur in the concept of human nature itself.’ Grotius regards 
self-preservation as essential to human nature, but sometimes he understands this 
as that of the individuals, sometimes as that of the nation and sometimes as that of 
the human species.80 While sociability and the preservation of mankind seem to be 
the main goal, it is self-preservation that is the main natural instinct. However, how 
can sociability be the main goal if self-preservation of the individual represents 
human nature? Is it God’s will that makes humans weak, so that humans need to 
strive to be sociable and survive? 
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There is an important difference between Grotius’ natural law theory and the 
biological theory of law. In the latter theory, genes, not humans, take centre stage. It 
is genes that replicate and that generate our traits. Genes have no goal. According to 
this theory, there is no goal, no summum bonum, no knowable god or divine will. 
Such notions as self-preservation, sociability and reason are not competing, nor are 
they fundamental to law. Naturally, these notions can help to spread genes, but in 
some situations, it will favour our genes if we give our lives to preserve our offspring 
or the group in which our offspring (or the offspring of our relatives) live. Sometimes it 
can pay not to be sociable and to be a free rider, especially if this behaviour goes 
undetected. Acting without thinking consciously can sometimes rescue us from 
sudden hazard and thus favour our genes, while in other circumstances conscious 
thought can help us find more food or protect ourselves against enemies. 
 
Grotius came very close to the modern biological theory of law, but fell short of 
reaching it by placing the self-preservation of the individual or the group in the centre, 
where it are genes that are the more fundamental concept. Arguably, natural law 
theory was at a temporary climax and then declined: Puffendorf reintroduced God 
and Finnis’ ‘self-evident’ seven basic goods lack a foundation in nature.81 
 
Westerman states that there are three reasons why a biological theory of natural law 
is impossible. The first reason concerns the ‘is’/‘ought’ problem. How can we derive 
norms from biological mechanisms? How can we know what is ‘reasonable’? Well, 
monkeys do – without reason. If they learn to give a stone for receiving fruit, they will 
become angry if another ape is given fruit without having to give a stone in return.82 If 
a chimpanzee takes away another chimpanzee’s food, the ‘victim’ will become angry 
and will try to punish the ‘thief’.83 Unconsciously these primates know very well what 
is ‘reasonable’. It is fair to get what you deserve, i.e., if efforts are rewarded and if 
free riders are punished. Why? Because reciprocity keeps a group stable, so that it 
can defend itself and group members can flourish and their genes can spread. 
Individuals feel a sense of fairness if the demand of reciprocity is met. Moral rules 
unconsciously create a modus vivendi.84 This also explains why norms are biased 
towards the in-group. It explains why the Israelites adopted the ten commandments 
as twelve tribes converged85 – new rules for a bigger in-group – and subsequently 
killed Amorites, Moabites and Canaanites, to name but a few. Group rules make 
group members cooperate better, so that they can defeat other groups and prevail. 
Group members ‘ought’ to behave according to group norms, for if they do not, they 
are weaker and are likely to be killed. Their genes will vanish. If the Israelites had not 
abided by these rules, the Canaanites could well have won and people could 
conceivably have thought for a long time that our laws were given to us by fertility 
gods. It is therefore very ‘reasonable’ to live according these biological mechanisms; 
without the behaviour they inspired our ancestors would have died and we would not 
have been here. As stated above, norms are a means our brains use to interpret 
facts so that we react to these facts in a way that benefits the spreading of the 
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underlying genes most. We feel we ought to live according to legal rules, because it 
is to our evolutionary benefit. In other words, we think normatively because empirical 
facts make us do so. 
 
Can nature never oblige, as Westerman claims? I very much doubt it. Millions of 
years of evolution have planted strong urges in our minds: urges to stay alive, urges 
to avoid torture and slavery, urges to defend ourselves, our group and our property, 
urges to learn, urges to avoid sibling mating, urges to punish free riders, urges to 
follow group norms, urges to reproduce, urges to keep sane, and so on and so forth. 
These urges, these dispositions should be met by positive law. Most of these 
dispositions have been transformed into universal rights. These dispositions oblige 
people to keep in line with group rules, simply because if they do not, the likelihood of 
their genes spreading will ultimately diminish. Biological mechanisms oblige strongly, 
and if we act accordingly we will feel happy. Can we counter this obligation by 
reasoning? For example, can we choose to give free rein to our urge to reproduce 
and ignore all other considerations, now we know it is all about that? If we try, others 
will punish us for it and we will feel bad. We can also conceive of a system which no 
longer requires punishment, but I very much doubt this will work because the human 
urge to punish is probably as strong as the urge to cheat. Therefore, ‘reason’ and 
positive law cannot but follow these biological dispositions. We feel we are obliged to 
live according to positive law, because if we do not, violence within society will 
increase and that is not in the interest of our genes. In our society, law-abiding 
behaviour is therefore a prerequisite. Positive law is not rigid, so there is no obligation 
to live by 19th-century law. Nevertheless, as explained above, biological mechanisms 
lay down the norms of positive law. Positive law is a way in which genes – through 
our brain – regulate our behaviour in the benefit of their spreading.  
 
Westerman’s third objection to a biological theory of law is the ‘enormous problem of 
translation’. Biological mechanisms cannot hope to be translated into guidelines to 
regulate human affairs. Admittedly, it is a long way from the replication of the genes 
to, say, section 30 of the Dutch Copyright Act. Nevertheless, the translation is not 
impossible.86 In the case of section 242 of the Dutch Penal Code, which criminalises 
rape, the translation is easier. Rape can offer a significant evolutionary advantage. Of 
the women that were raped in the Netherlands in 2006 6.9% became pregnant,87 
which from a clinical perspective is a significantly reproductive benefit.88 If this were a 
net benefit, not outweighed by costs, rape as a reproductive strategy would increase 
rapidly. It is therefore likely that rape will continue (and even increase) in situations 
where the male unconscious estimates the costs to be low. In a stable, male-led 
society, a system of control, honour, law, coercion and punishment has to keep men 
‘civilized’. However, this system does not come from the outside, it grows within 
communities because the genes that benefit from a stable society – where free riders 
will face high costs – will have a stimulating effect on its evolution. When individual 
group members act as free riders, the other group members will experience this 
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behaviour as unjust and they will take action to restore the balance. They will punish 
the free riders and overwhelm the benefits of the free rider behaviour.89 Accordingly, 
they will put down this urge in rules that give this urge a more convincing status. Just 
like the Israelites formulated rules that had to stabilise their society and gave these 
laws a sanctified basis, we enshrine our urges in ‘obligatory’ positive law. Find all 
mechanisms that underlie human affairs will require a great deal of research, but 
because genes are a conditio sine qua non for human affairs,  a genetic factor will 




Westerman claims modern biological theories cannot inform a theory of natural law. 
Yet I have presented a biological theory of law that meets all criteria of natural law 
theory. Chemical, genetic and biological mechanisms are the basis on which positive 
law can be justified. They are by definition grounded in nature and human beings can 
discover these principles by thinking consciously. The biological principles also are 
morally obligatory, because not living by them is tantamount to failure to live in a 
group, with the undesired result that underlying genes will not spread. ‘Reason’ and 
‘normative thinking’ are the result of biological processes; there are no external 
sources (e.g., a god (Aquinas, Puffendorf, Suarèz) or society (Durkheim, Finnis)). A 
biological theory of law needs to be monistic, not dualistic. The problem for previous 
natural law theorists such as Grotius was that human nature was their point of 
departure. What humans experience as facts or norms depends on how their genes 
are involved. It is ‘reasonable’ to act according to nature, because if our ancestors 
had not, we simply would not have existed. We could act contrary to those biological 
mechanisms, but doing so would make us feel unhappy, because our genes have 
programmed us to heed those mechanisms. We are biologically driven to live by 
group rules. This makes us feel happy and will help spread our genes. This is very 
much an obliging principle, because for millions of years it was our raison d’être. We 
cannot simply ignore that fact without feeling very unhappy and without being 
punished by group members. Ethics did not materialise out of thin air,90 but 
developed as a set of rules of conduct whose ultimate purpose is to further the 
spreading of genes. If we act in the interest of the group, the group will be stable and 
can defend our personal interests, interests that eventually come down to the 
spreading of our genes. In this way, it is possible to vest ethics, norms and law on 
biological mechanisms. This requires a monistic way of thinking, which is in fact how 
modern  science works. 
 
Now that I have argued that the decline of natural law theory was not the result of the 
invalidity of natural law itself, but of following the wrong path after Grotius’ theory, 
there is no reason to suppose that this biological theory of law is a fable. I agree with 
Westerman’s metaphor that the painter does not take a ‘universal’ brush to make his 
painting.91 Even so, all brushes consist of a handle and hairs. This also means that 
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Penguin Press 1995, p. 467. 
91 Westerman (note 11), p. 294. 
we do not move in circles of interaction. We do eat to live, not live to eat.92 We like 
eating, we like cooking, we like to buy food, we like earning money to be able to buy 
food, we punish those who take our food and money, because our genes urge us to 
strive to stay alive and to reproduce. We create, apply and rely on rules to justify 
punishment, rules that actually derive from biological mechanisms. Maybe, just 
maybe, such mechanisms were created by an unknowable entity, but that is a matter 
of faith and not of science. 
  
                                                 
92 Lon L. Fuller, Means and Ends, in: Kenneth I. Winston (ed.), Principles of Social Order, Durham: 
Duke University Press 1981, p. 54. 
